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We propose a new test, derived from a set of variance decompositions of a 
structural VAR, for the success of inflation targeting.  In contrast to standard 
sacrifice ratios this test considers changes in the structure of real and nominal 
shocks; second moment effects.  We find strong support for IT with 7 of the 9 
countries in our sample having negative “sacrifices” and many countries with 
“benefits”. However, we also find very different performances across IT 
countries.  We find that “IT success” depends on the size of the real shocks 
suffered but controlling for this there are differences in country performance. 
 
JEL Categories:  E42, E52 
 
Keywords: Inflation targeting, Structural Vector Auto-Regression (VAR)
                                                           
1We are grateful to Ricardo Hausmann, Leonardo Leiderman, Klaus Schmidt Hebbel and Ted Truman for 
comments.  Naturally all errors remain are own.  Please address comments to Andrew Powell at 
apowell@utdt.edu 1. Introduction 
 
Inflation targeting has become popular in both academic and policy-making 
circles.  In this paper we consider 9 countries that have adopted IT regimes
2, 
ranging from pioneering New Zealand to other industrialised countries, 
including Australia, Canada, Sweden and the UK, to several more recent 
emerging country converts including Mexico and Brazil, the pioneer in Latin 
America, Chile, and finally Israel
3. 
 
There is also a growing academic literature on IT
4.  Chapter 10 of Bernanke et 
al (1999) is devoted to a comparative analysis, considering largely a sample of 
industrialised countries.  Three questions are posed; (1) does IT make 
disinflation less costly? (2) does IT reduce inflation expectations?, and (3) 
does IT change the behaviour of inflation?  The preliminary conclusion is that, 
countries that have adopted IT have seen inflation levels and inflation 
expectations fall below what would be expected given extrapolations of past 
behaviour. However, this analysis finds no support for the view that 
disinflation is less costly under IT
5.  Still, the authors shy away from 
concluding whether this implies that IT fails to "create credibility" or whether 
                                                           
2 We also comment in the text on the case of Spain that adopted an IT regime before joining 
EMU.  We do not include Spain in the empirical section due to the very short period of IT. 
3 It is also interesting that the two most largest currency areas by GDP, Euroland and the 
US, have not adopted IT regimes - see Bernanke et al 1999 for a discussion. 
4 Notable empirical contributions using cross-country samples include Bernanke et al 
(1999), Schmidt Hebbel and Werner (2002), Corbo, Landerretche and Schmidt Hebbel 
(2001) and Debelle (1997).  For a more theoretical review see, for example, Svensson 
(1998). See Haldane (1999) for an attempt to draw out general lessons from the UK 
experience and Mishkin (2000) for a review of the issues from the standpoint of emerging 
countries. 
5 This result stems from comparing sacrifice ratios (normally defined as the output loss for 
each percentage point reduction in inflation) between IT and non-IT countries. this reflects a confirmation of previous results that the structure of monetary 
policy has little impact on the output-inflation trade-off in the short run. 
 
Schmidt Hebbel and Werner (2002) focus on the performance of emerging 
country inflation targeters in Latin America: namely Brazil, Chile and Mexico 
but also present comparative statistics against a wider control group of IT 
countries. While the post IT period has been associated with lower inflation, 
the sacrifice ratios presented by these authors show a slight deterioration for 
Brazil and Mexico and an improvement for Chile
6. They also present a variety 
of empirical exercises to attempt to understand the effect of IT in these three 
countries. 
 
One analysis, that they claim is standard, is to run a Vector Auto Regression 
including as endogenous variables the real interest policy rate, the inflation 
target, core inflation, output growth, money growth and the real exchange rate. 
There are at least two issues worth discussing with this methodology. One is 
that their sample periods cover pre and post-IT periods and hence they use an 
expected inflation proxy for the inflation target in the pre IT period
7. Second, 
the inflation target is a step variable and given that it is a target set by the 
Central Bank, it is not clear how to interpret the error term in the equation for 
                                                           
6 Sacrifice ratios are again the output loss (GDP and industrial output) for each percentage 
point reduction in inflation.  
7 The analysis is conducted recursively and the authors discuss the difference in the impulse 
responses in the pre and post inflation-targeting period. While the results are suggestive, if 
the IT target is a better predictor of expected inflation than the proxy employed in the pre 
IT period, then that could explain why the effect of target changes becomes more 
significant after IT without that target having any real influence on actual inflation. It is 
also not clear what the policy interest rate variable corresponds to in the pre IT period.   that variable (treated as endogenous) nor what its statistical properties are.  It 
is difficult to estimate how these issues affect the results presented
8. 
 
IT regimes have in general developed as a way to move away from other 
nominal anchors and in particular from explicit or implicit exchange rate 
targets or bands towards greater exchange rate flexibility. One of the potential 
benefits of floating exchange rates is that these rates can then respond to real 
shocks and act as a type of shock absorber for the rest of the economy. At the 
same time, floating exchange rates may imply a sacrifice in that real exchange 
rates may become more volatile and PPP deviations more severe
9. On the 
other hand, if IT regimes develop credibility and are successful then perhaps 
we would expect that floating with IT would result in only small and non-
persistent nominal shocks on the real exchange rate and hence for real rates 
not to be unduly affected. 
 
The current 'tests' regarding the 'success' of IT regimes as mentioned above 
stress the effect of IT on inflation expectations and outcome inflation levels.  
These might be thought of as first moment effects.  However, a different way 
to consider the question of whether IT changes the behaviour of inflation and 
other variables is to consider how the adoption of IT affects the structure and 
the impact of nominal and real shocks – second moment effects.  As discussed 
we might, on the one hand, expect that the nominal exchange rate would 
become more volatile and be driven more by real shocks as the exchange rate 
                                                           
8 The results claim a strong and significant effect of IT target changes on inflation in Chile 
and significant but quantitatively small effects of IT target changes in Mexico and Brazil. 
9 A previous literature focused on the “excess volatility” of nominal rates with rational 
models of over-shooting and bubbles as well as irrational panics and herd behavior 
potentially driving real rates away from equilibrium or fundamental values.      acts as a shock absorber. This may be thought of as the benefit of floating with 
IT. However, on the other hand if the real exchange rate becomes more 
volatile and driven more by nominal shocks, then this would constitute a 
sacrifice. Successful IT regimes should then have only a small (or no) 
sacrifice and significant benefits. 
 
These arguments suggest a different 'test' regarding the 'success' of IT regimes.  
Namely an analysis of the structure of shocks between the real and the 
nominal exchange rate and this is indeed the approach taken in this paper.  We 
are helped in this regard by Enders and Lee (1997) who consider the structure 
of nominal and real exchange rate shocks between G4 countries in the post 
Bretton Woods era. We follow their methodology here, which in turn employs 
the estimation of a structural VAR as suggested by Blanchard and Quah 
(1999).   However our purpose is different.  We estimate structural VARS for 
9 countries splitting the sample between 'prior IT' and 'post IT' windows
10. In 
some cases, where data permits, and notably the UK and Chile, we also split 
the 'post IT' sample into two to test whether there is evidence of changes as, 
perhaps, the IT regime has gained credibility over time. 
 
Our results suggest that IT has indeed allowed the nominal exchange rate to 
react more to real shocks as nominal exchange rate regimes have become 
closer to pure floats. In other words the benefits have been positive.  However, 
the results on sacrifices are surprising to say the least.  We find that for a set of 
IT regimes, mainly in industrialised countries, there are no sacrifices. 
                                                           
10 Note that this methodology does not employ the inflation target directly within the VAR.  
It is then a more indirect test regarding changes in the relation between nominal and real 
shocks in the economy. However, we also find considerable variation across countries as to how IT is 
performing.  
 
The paper is organised as follows.  In section 2, we briefly discuss the 
adoption of IT in the sample countries.  Section 3 develops the empirical 
methodology while section 4 is devoted to a discussion of the data and the 
results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Adoption of Inflation Targeting in a Sample of Industrialised and 
Developing Countries. 
 
In this paper we conduct tests on 9 countries that have adopted IT regimes.  To 
give some background, in this section we briefly contrast the developments in 
these economies as they adopted IT.  While each country has its own 
particular context and monetary history, we attempt to delineate some 
common themes across the countries in this highly summarised account. We 
also discuss briefly the differences in the way in which IT has been 





In Table 1 we detail the countries in the sample and the dates at which IT was 
adopted
12,13.  As can be seen from the Table the first country to adopt IT was 
                                                           
11 This section draws on Bernanke et al (1999), Schmidt Hebbel and Werrner (2000) and 
information from the websites of the relevant Central Banks.  
12 These dates are largely speaking the dates when the relevant Central Banks claim to have 
adopted IT.  
13 It is sometimes debatable exactly when IT was adopted as Central Banks do not always 
give specific dates and others appear to 'jump the gun' in claiming IT adoption.  See for New Zealand in 1990 although other countries followed rapidly. The latest IT 
country in our sample is Brazil and we use 1999 as the date for its adoption. 
Countries have adopted IT in quite different macroeconomic settings. Here we 
identify three main circumstances. First, several countries in our sample 
adopted IT after a period of poor economic performance, weak economic 
credibility and a desire to seek greater transparency in monetary operations 
and a belief that with greater transparency might come greater credibility and 
(hence) improved economic performance. Countries fitting this set of stylised 
facts include New Zealand, Canada, Australia and arguably Mexico. Second, 
countries have adopted IT as a way to obtain greater flexibility moving away 
from an exchange rate band after a significant deflation frequently obtained 
using the exchange rate band as nominal anchor
14. Countries in this group 
include Israel, Chile and Spain
15. The third group are countries that suffered 
an exchange rate crisis as an exchange rate band was forcibly abandoned and 
IT was then adopted in its aftermath, in part, as a way to attempt to regain 
credibility. Countries in this category include Brazil, Sweden and the UK
16. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
example Benanke et al (1999) for a discussion of the Australian case.  The IT adoption date 
for Chile is in particular debatable with the Central Bank typically claiming 1991, but also 
note Schmidt Hebbel and Werner (2002) suggesting that only, "In 1999-2000 the Bank 
upgraded its monetary framework to full inflation targeting" pp36.  This later date 
coincided with the disposal of the exchange rate band and development of the Central 
Bank's modeling and forecasting activities. 
14 This is not to say that there were not also significant deflations in other countries such as 
New Zealand but the countries included here used an exchange rate anchor during the 
deflation and the deflation was immediately prior to the adoption of IT. 
15 Spain adopted IT also within the context of explicitly seeking EMU membership and 
within the context of following the rules of ERM II - including making the Central Bank 
independent.  Spain subsequently joined EMU.  We do not consider Spain in the empirical 
analysis due to the short period in the post IT regime prior to EMU entry. 
16 Mexico also suffered an exchange rate crisis prior to adopting IT but the crisis was in 
early 1994 and the adoption of IT was much later and hence we include Mexico in the first 
group. Table 1: Adopting IT 
Adoption of IT Before IT After IT Frequency
New Zealand 1990 1980-1989 1990-2001 quarterly
Canada 1991 1980-1990 1991-2001 monthly
Chile 1991 1986-1990 1991-2001 monthly
Israel 1991 1986-1990 1991-2001 monthly
Australia 1993 1980-1992 1993-2001 quarterly
United Kingdom 1993 1980-1991 1993-2001 monthly
Sweden 1995 1985-1994 1995-2001 monthly
Brazil 1999 1994-1998 1999-2001 monthly
Mexico 1999 1996-1998 1999-2001 monthly  
 
Prior to adopting IT, the countries in our sample had a variety of monetary 
regimes. These ranged from a non-transparent (or "just do it") style of 
monetary policy that characterised the prior IT regimes of Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand, and arguably Mexico, to the exchange rate targeting 
regimes of Spain, Sweden and the UK to the more explicit exchange rate 
bands of Brazil, Chile, Israel
17. Each of the countries in the sample had some 
measure of nominal exchange rate flexibility in the prior IT regime. Perhaps 
the hardest 'fix' was the exchange rate band of the Brazilian real plan but even 
here the nominal exchange rate varied within band, the band crawled and the 
band was also adjusted a number of times. 
 
Characteristics of IT regimes 
 
There is considerable debate in the IT literature as to the appropriate way to 
conduct IT
18.   Here we focus on six particular characteristics to illustrate 
                                                           
17 Chile maintained the exchange rate band after adopting IT. However, Schmidt Hebbel 
and Werner (2002) claim that the inflation target always had priority and the exchange rate 
band was adjusted several times.  
18 Svennson (1988) suggests that IT, as practiced in New Zealand, Canada, the UK, Sweden 
and Australia can be thought of as, “ (1) an explicit quantitative inflation target, (2) an some of the similarities and differences in IT regimes across the world.  The 
characteristics are (i) if specific IT legislation has been enacted, (ii) if Central 
Banks are independent, (iii) how inflation is defined, (iv) the role of the 
exchange rate and whether an explicit and transparent monetary conditions 
index is used (v) the type of target adopted and (vi) the degree of flexibility 
that exists around that target
19. 
 
Most industrialised countries have enacted specific legislation regarding IT - 
the exception being Canada.  However, emerging countries have tended to lag 
behind this trend.  Also, most IT countries have given formal independence 
(objective or goal) to their Central Bank but Brazil and Mexico to date have 
not.  There is considerable debate in the IT literature as to what measure of 
inflation should be employed. Most countries use headline CPI inflation 
however New Zealand and Australia use an underlying inflation index that 
takes out certain volatile components. 
 
Inflation targeting appears to have become particularly popular in small open 
economies – as evidenced by our 9-country sample.  The role of the exchange 
rate is then a crucial variable in all of these IT regimes.  Indeed, some 
countries have defined an explicit Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) or 
similar - most transparently in Canada, New Zealand and Israel - for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
operating procedure can be described as inflation forecast targeting…. and (3) a high 
degree of transparency and accountability”. 
19 Bernanke et al (1999) suggest ten operational and communication issues are paramount 
(which we have summarized in the 6 listed above); (1) which measure of inflation should 
be used?, (2) what numerical value should the target have? (3) a price level or an inflation 
target? (4) what horizons? (5) a point or a range? (6) what information should be used in 
policy making? (7) when should deviations from the target be allowed? (8) when is the best 
time to implement IT? (9) what should be communicated and in what forum? (10) to what 
degree should central banks be held accountable? purposes of short term monetary control. In the case of Canada and New 
Zealand, for example, a change in the MCI is defined as the weighted sum of 
changes in 90 day commercial paper interest rate and the trade weighted 
exchange rate (with weights 3 to 1 for Canada and 2: 1 for New Zealand). In 
the case of New Zealand a 2% rise in the exchange rate is then estimated to 
have the same effect as a 1% point rise in interest rates.  This ratio indicates 
particularly the importance of the exchange rate in the case of NZ.  Since July 
1997, the reserve bank has published a forecast of the MCI to indicate the path 
of monetary policy for the following three years if conditions remain 
unchanged. 
 
Haldane (1999) contrasts the automatic use of an MCI index to govern 
monetary policy responses to exchange rate changes versus what he refers to 
as a “spot the shock” approach where the monetary policy response is 
conditioned on a view as to what caused the exchange rate to move.  Schmidt-
Hebbel and Werner (2002) also devote a section of their paper to the role of 
the exchange rate within the IT frameworks of Brazil, Chile and Mexico.  
Their focus is on the related issues of whether there is evidence of high pass-
through from the exchange rate to interest rate behaviour and whether there 
has been a 'fear of floating' in these countries
20. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
20 On the latter they conclude that considering the volatility of exchange rates and reserves, 
"fear of floating has declined substantially with the adoption of the floating regime, and it 
appears to be levelling off towards levels observed in the more mature floaters" (namely 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand). Regarding "pass through", they suggest that, 
controlling for inflation, exchange rate movements do not lead to significant changes in 
interest rates in the three countries analysed.  There are also differences as to how the target should be specified. The UK, 
Brazil, Chile Sweden and Australia have tended to adopt point targets whereas 
Canada, New Zealand and Israel have inflation ranges
21.  Finally regarding 
flexibility, New Zealand also has the most explicit rule-based system.  The 
UK has a formal procedure if inflation is outside of the range involving a 
public letter from the Central Bank Governor to the Minister explaining the 
situation.  Other countries have fewer rules and hence, arguably, greater 
flexibility.  Flexibility is often related to whether the Central Bank only has 
the inflation target or other objectives such as output stabilization as well.  
Most Central Banks in our sample have other goals as well as simply the 
inflation target although with arguably with varying weights
22. 
 
This brief description of some of the salient characteristics serves to highlight 
that while a variety of countries claim to have adopted Inflation Targeting 
there is still considerable debate as to what IT actually means and differences 
as to how it is implemented across the globe.  We come back to this as we 
discuss the results.
                                                           
21 See the discussion in Haldane (1999) regarding the alleged benefits of a specific target 
rather than a range. 
22 See Svensson (1997) for a discussion on strict versus flexible inflation targeting.  
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
 
In this section, we describe the methodology we use to analyse the 
performance of IT regimes.  Our approach is to consider how the adoption of 
IT by a country affects the behaviour of the nominal and real exchange rate. 
One possible alternative to study this type of problem would be to consider a 
structural model of exchange rate determination. However, the empirical 
evidence, as reviewed in Enders and Lee (1997) (EL hereafter), suggests that 
these kinds of models do not explain well real and nominal exchange rate 
movements. Instead of using a structural specification, we follow EL and 
decompose the exchange rate movements into changes induced by real versus 
nominal factors
23.  By studying the structure of real and nominal shocks and 
their effects, before and after the adoption of IT, we can assess the 
performance of this new monetary regime. 
 
The proposed decomposition is based on the technique developed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) (BQ hereafter). The basic idea behind this 
decomposition is the estimation of a reduced form vector autoregressive 
model (VAR) for both exchange rates, real and nominal, and then to 
decompose the exchange rate series into movements caused by real shocks 
and those caused by nominal shocks. 
 
 
                                                           
23 Moreover EL shows that the decomposition is consistent with a number of theories 
regarding exchange rate determination.  
We assume that the real shocks affect both real and nominal rates similarly 
while the nominal shocks affect both rates differently. In the latter case, 
consistent with the idea of long-run money-neutrality, the nominal shocks are 
assumed to have only a temporary, rather than permanent, effect on the real 
exchange rate. This is the key restriction that allows BQ to identify both type 
of shocks. 
 
Before we can formulate the model, it is necessary to analyse the stochastic 
properties of both exchange rate series. If both series are stationary, an 
unrestricted stable VAR model in levels can be specified; if both series are 
characterised by unit root processes and they are co-integrated, then the 
correct model to be specified will be a restricted VAR for the variables in 
first-differences incorporating the co-integrating vector to represent the long 
run; finally, if both series are non-stationary but they are not co-integrated, 




For ease of exposition, we consider the BQ decomposition technique for an 
unrestricted VAR model for both rates expressed in first-differences, 
 
 
                                                           
24 In a set of preliminary results we find that in general the relevant series are I(1) but are 
not co-integrated.  The exceptions are Mexico and Israel in the post-IT period where we 
find the series are I(1) and cointegrated.  In these cases we incorporate the cointegrating 
vector into the relevant empirical model.  
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where et and rt are the nominal and real exchange rates, respectively; the β ’s, 
and γ ’s are the parameters of the model; ε  = [ε 1, ε 2]’ = [∆ et, ∆ rt]’ – E([∆ et, 
∆ rt]’ | [∆ et-s, ∆ rt-s]’, s ≥  1), with var(ε ) = Σ ; and ∆  = 1-L, with L being the lag 
operator. In the empirical analysis below we use the nominal dollar exchange 
rate for almost all countries except for Sweden and United Kingdom for which 
we employ the German DM (and subsequently the Euro).  We use the WPI to 
calculate the relevant real exchange rates. 
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where, urt and unt are zero-mean mutually uncorrelated real and nominal 
shocks, respectively. BQ show that one can impose restrictions on any of the 
two models in order to identify real and nominal shocks in the system. In 
particular, the restriction that the nominal shocks have no long-run effect on 
the real exchange rate is represented by the restriction that in the moving 









That is the cumulative effect of unt on ∆ r over time is zero. Similarly, because 
the sum of b12 from zero to infinity is the same, as the effect of un on r after an 
infinite number of periods, the nominal shock has only short run effects on the 
real exchange rate
25. This restriction on the moving average representation can 
be equivalently expressed in terms of the VAR model by the following 
expression, 
() () 0 ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 1
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This means that, as suggested by the theory, in the long run real shocks can 
cause permanent changes in the real exchange rate, but nominal shocks can 
cause only temporary movements in the real rate. 
 
In our applied work we would like to know the response of one of the 
exchange rate to an exogenous impulse in another variable. That is, we would 
like to trace out what happens to the estimated system during subsequent 
periods after an exogenous shock has occurred. Specifically, we would like to 
separate the variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks to 
the VAR. Therefore we employ variance decompositions. The variance 
decomposition provides information about the relative importance of each 
random innovation in affecting the first differences in the real and nominal 
                                                           
25  See Blanchard and Quah (1989) or Enders and Lee (1997). exchange rates.  Using the variance decompositions we can then see whether 
IT has had any systematic effect on the relative importance of the component 
shocks driving the real and nominal exchange rate. 
 
To assess the statistical significance of any changes in the variance 
decompositions we compute 90% bootstrapping confidence intervals
26. These 
intervals are computed in the following way. First, we estimate the 
corresponding VAR system and obtain the estimated coefficients and residuals 
from both equations.  Second, from the vector residuals we select randomly a 
new vector of residuals that we call the bootstrapping residuals vector. With 
this new residuals’ vector and the estimated coefficients of step one, we 
reproduce the values of both dependent variables. Third, once we have the 
bootstrapping values of the dependent variables, we repeat the VAR 
estimation and produce the structural variance decomposition. Next, we go to 
the second step and repeat this procedure. 
 
We perform this simulation 1000 times so that after the simulation process is 
complete we have for each forecasting period, 1000 replications of the 
variance decomposition. Then, for each forecasting period we construct a 90% 






To analyse the success of IT regimes, we propose  a new sacrifice and a 
benefit ratio as a function of the variance decompositions.  On the one hand, 
we expect the real exchange rate to be driven more by nominal shocks.  Hence 
we propose a sacrifice ratio expressed as:  
S = % of r explained by NS after IT - % of r explained by NS before IT 
Where r is the real exchange rate and NS is a nominal shock.. 
A positive number for S represents a sacrifice in the sense that the real 
exchange rate is now affected more by nominal shocks after IT than before
27. 
On the other hand, we may also expect the nominal exchange rate to become 
more volatile and be driven more by the real shocks.  This in our view 
constitutes the 'benefit' - the fact that nominal exchange rates can act more as a 
shock absorber for real shocks. We then define a benefit ratio as: 
B = % of e rate explained by RS after IT - % of e explained by RS before IT 
 
Where e is the nominal exchange rate and RS is a real shock. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
26 Naturally, these confidence levels also serve to analyze whether the variance 
decompositions are statistically significant in them-selves and not just due to say sampling 
error. 
27 We note that the Blanchard and Quah (1989) identification procedure in the structural 
VAR imposes the constraint that in the long run the nominal shock does not affect the real 
exchange rate however this does not imply a restriction on the variance decompositions and 
does not therefore invalidate the above ratio. In this case, a positive number for B represents a benefit. This is the case 
when an IT regime allows the nominal exchange rate to be affected more by 
the real shocks and hence act more as a type of 'shock absorber'. 
 
In the case of the UK and Chile we also split the post-IT sample to analyse 
how the these sacrifice and benefit ratios change comparing the two post-IT 
periods against the period pre-IT.  Our idea is that if we find that the benefit 
ratio becomes more positive and the sacrifice ratio more negative, then there is 
evidence that the IT regime has become more successful over time.  The 
nominal exchange rate would then have become more affected by the real 
shocks and the real exchange rate less affected by the nominal shocks. 
 
Finally, we analyse the results across countries in the post IT regime to 
consider how different IT regimes in different countries are functioning.  In 
particular we seek to ascertain whether there are systemic differences in the 
structure of the shocks.  We find strong and interesting country differences. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we present the results of the empirical analysis in 9 countries 
that have adopted IT.  In Table 2 below we first present the results for the 
structural model identified using the Blanchard and Quah technique for the 9 
countries.  The table for each country gives the long run coefficients for the 
structural model and standard errors.  As can be seen many coefficients are 
significant at any standard significance level and they are all of the expected 
sign.  
Table 2: 
Chile 0.000493 0.015967 0.016521 0.011588
(0.002062) (0.001458) (0.001460) (0.000727)
0.023128 0.000000 0.016004 0.000000
(0.002111) (0.001004)
Mexico 0.022129 0.012413 0.010352 0.006659
(0.003832) (0.001918) (0.002424) (0.000940)
0.031578 0.000000 0.026757 0.000000
0.002958 (0.003273)
Brazil 0.004786 0.007688 0.037640 0.013203
(0.001143) (0.000740) (0.005615) (0.001764)
0.020639 0.000000 0.047020 0.000000
(0.001986) (0.006283)
United Kingdom 0.024728 0.004213 0.024678 0.007194
(0.001526) (0.000253) (0.001833) (0.000494)
0.024118 0.000000 0.024965 0.000000
(0.001447) (0.001715)
New Zealand 0.053542 0.025813 0.060371 0.009804
(0.007637) (0.003042) (0.006389) (0.001011)
0.054790 0.000000 0.050060 0.000000
(0.006457) (0.005163)
Australia 0.039608 0.013564 0.067315 0.011490
(0.004401) (0.001356) (0.008161) (0.001354)
0.037491 0.000000 0.066130 0.000000
(0.003749) (0.007793)
Sweden 0.020203 0.007760 0.023491 0.006142
(0.001484) (0.000501) (0.001956) (0.00048)
0.021053 0.000000 0.022441 0.000000
(0.001359) (0.001752)
Israel 0.015293 0.016285 0.002264 0.019043
(0.002589) (0.001525) (0.00167) (0.001176)
0.024711 0.000000 0.014193 0.000000
(0.002314) (0.000877)
Canada 0.009731 0.006103 0.011501 0.005913
(0.000807) (0.000379) (0.000875) (0.000364)
0.012849 0.000000 0.012633 0.000000
(0.000797) (0.000777)
Pre - IT Post - IT
 Given the coefficients of the structural model, we then estimate the variance 
decompositions and confidence intervals as described in the previous section.  
In Table 3 below we detail the results for each country for the pre and post IT 
regimes with 90% confidence intervals for lags of 1, 5 and 10 periods. As can 
be seen the confidence intervals are relatively tight indicating that the variance 
decompositions are in general very well defined.  More specifically, in only 
very few cases do we find that the confidence intervals overlap – in other 
words we find strong evidence for changes in the structure of shocks in the pre 
and post IT regimes. Table 3: Variance Decompositions and 90% Confidence Intervals 
Pre IT Post IT Pre IT Post IT Pre IT Post IT Pre IT Post IT
Chile
   Lag 1 84.70 41.14 15.30 58.86 7.05 10.10 92.95* 89.90*
(83.77-86.06) (39.82-43.15) (15.30-15.74) (58.74-59.68) (7.04-7.57) (9.93-10.76) (91.58-94.85) (88.38-91.91)
   Lag 5 81.07 39.75 18.93 60.25 9.35 13.33 90.65 86.67
(80.25-82.44) (38.80-41.31) (18.89-19.53) (59.63-61.50) (9.35-9.94) (13.08-13.94) (89.29-92.59) (85.02-88.69)
   Lag 10 81.06 39.74 18.94 60.26 9.36 13.35 90.64 86.65
(80.25-82.43) (38.81-41.31) (18.90-19.54) (59.63-61.51) (9.35-9.94) (13.10-13.96) (89.28-92.59) (85.00-88.67)
Mexico
   Lag 1 74.57 65.25 25.43 34.75 49.10 30.47 50.90 69.53
(71.75-78.44) (64.40-67.35) (25.42-26.48) (34.70-36.06) (47.96-52.59) (30.25-31.71) (50.56-53.60) (68.41-71.67)
   Lag 5 70.41 65.94 29.59 34.06 50.30 33.91 49.70 66.09
(68.59-73.79) (65.62-67.18) (28.87-31.85) (33.01-36.01) (49.27-52.59) (33.77-34.56) (47.80-52.86) (64.14-68.56)
   Lag 10 70.38 65.19 29.62 34.81 50.65 33.20 49.35 66.80
(68.60-73.75) (64.88-66.37) (28.87-31.85) (33.70-36.81) (49.63-52.95) (33.08-33.87) (47.42-52.56) (64.82-69.32)
Brazil
   Lag 1 99.81 67.07 0.19 32.93 25.35 34.97 74.65 65.03
(99.40-100.73) (65.55-70.55) (0.19-0.71) (32.40-35.41) (25.31-25.96) (34.20-37.44) (74.09-75.78) (63.29-68.48)
   Lag 5 93.47 61.07 6.53 38.93 27.94 40.94 72.06 59.06
(93.09-94.33) (60.78-62.15) (6.44-7.12) (35.40-43.24) (27.88-28.37) (40.78-41.75) (71.11-73.38) (54.87-63.90)
   Lag 10 93.44 61.08 6.56 38.92 27.94 40.95 72.06 59.05
(93.07-94.31) (60.78-62.15) (6.46-7.15) (35.40-43.24) (27.88-28.37) (40.79-41.75) (71.11-73.38) (54.85-63.89)
United Kingdom
   Lag 1 22.19 4.71 77.81 95.29 11.03 0.65 88.97 99.35
(20.69-24.39) (3.36-6.97) (77.36-78.96) (95.28-96.19) (10.43-12.20) (0.65-1.41) (87.45-91.06) (97.80-101.65)
   Lag 5 28.87 7.72 71.13 92.28 18.71 4.69 81.29 95.31
(28.66-29.36) (7.43-8.99) (68.81-73.73) (91.20-94.33) (18.55-19.09) (4.55-5.63) (78.83-83.95) (93.86-97.56)
   Lag 10 29.53 8.05 70.47 91.95 19.61 4.94 80.39 95.06
(29.35-29.99) (7.77-9.31) (68.07-73.13) (90.86-94.02) (19.47-19.95) (4.80-5.89) (77.86-83.11) (93.62-97.32)
New Zealand
   Lag 1 71.20 11.79 28.80 88.21 54.18 2.90 45.82 97.10
(68.87-77.61) (9.81-15.95) (28.07-33.61) (88.16-90.42) (53.01-58.69) (2.82-4.94) (43.44-51.55) (95.07-101.11)
   Lag 2 70.65 14.80 29.35 85.20 56.01 9.91 43.99 90.09
(69.57-74.95) (14.36-17.00) (26.47-35.44) (83.06-89.09) (55.61-57.74) (9.65-11.35) (38.63-50.69) (87.30-94.07)
   Lag 4 66.12 17.80 33.88 82.20 52.48 18.73 47.52 81.27
(65.64-67.81) (17.40-20.17) (28.14-40.81) (79.96-86.40) (52.24-53.35) (18.53-20.79) (41.04-54.63) (78.70-85.68)
Australia
   Lag 1 23.36 0.09 76.64 99.91 8.87* 9.16* 91.13* 90.84*
(20.62-27.68) (0.09-0.51) (75.88-78.99) (95.75-104.48) (8.11-11.07) (5.46-14.06) (88.20-95.52) (90.84-92.05)
   Lag 2 25.60 0.51 74.40 99.49 15.09 9.40 84.91 90.60
(24.38-28.25) (0.47-1.28) (71.88-78.33) (95.64-104.05) (14.56-16.49) (5.81-14.41) (80.93-89.75) (90.58-92.04)
   Lag 4 25.69 2.36 74.31 97.64 15.17 9.52 84.83* 90.48*
(24.46-28.30) (2.00-3.86) (71.73-78.28) (94.10-102.32) (14.62-16.59) (7.85-13.45) (80.83-89.69) (88.74-94.48)
Sweden
   Lag 1 30.48 16.27 69.52 83.73 12.35 3.22 87.65 96.78
(29.41-32.26) (15.03-18.29) (69.31-70.44) (83.71-84.51) (12.09-13.27) (3.12-3.87) (86.52-89.42) (95.41-98.71)
   Lag 5 33.03 16.54 66.97 83.46 14.63 4.54 85.37 95.46
(32.56-33.84) (15.81-18.09) (65.72-68.57) (82.93-84.80) (14.43-15.06) (4.35-4.98) (83.71-87.25) (93.83-97.35)
   Lag 10 34.98 16.59 65.02 83.41 16.13 4.62 83.87 95.38
(34.60-35.70) (15.91-18.13) (63.65-66.74) (82.87-84.80) (15.94-16.55) (4.45-5.06) (82.19-85.79) (93.74-97.27)
Israel
   Lag 1 74.03 99.57 25.97 0.43 23.35 1.09 76.65 98.91
(72.81-76.07) (97.93-101.54) (25.81-26.96) (0.43-0.76) (23.16-24.31) (1.09-1.23) (75.47-78.59) (97.72-100.24)
   Lag 5 72.64 96.98 27.36 3.02 28.41 3.09 71.59 96.91
(71.56-74.50) (95.41-98.96) (26.98-28.51) (3.00-3.46) (28.24-29.07) (3.08-3.31) (69.96-73.69) (95.77-98.28)
   Lag 10 72.64 96.97 27.36 3.03 28.41 3.09 71.59 96.91
(71.56-74.50) (95.40-98.95) (26.98-28.51) (3.00-3.47) (28.24-29.07) (3.09-3.32) (69.96-73.69) (95.79-98.28)
Canada
   Lag 1 46.29 43.33 53.71 56.67 13.80 4.86 86.20 95.14
(45.51-47.42) (42.29-44.70) (53.56-54.19) (56.63-57.01) (13.60-14.29) (4.82-5.14) (85.30-87.38) (94.09-96.42)
   Lag 5 47.34 42.95 52.66 57.05 20.80 7.32 79.20 92.68
(46.73-48.25) (42.21-44.08) (52.30-53.34) (56.72-57.76) (20.62-21.17) (7.24-7.64) (78.13-80.47) (91.62-93.97)
   Lag 10 47.34 42.95 52.66 57.05 20.80 7.32 79.20 92.68
(46.73-48.25) (42.21-44.08) (52.30-53.34) (56.73-57.76) (20.62-21.17) (7.24-7.64) (78.13-80.47) (91.62-93.97)
* indicates that the 90% two sided confidence intervals overlap.  In all other cases we then find strong evidence of changes
between pre and post IT regimes
Nominal Exchange Rate Real Exchange Rate
Nominal Shock Real Shock Nominal Shock Real Shock
  
We are now in a position to consider the benefit and sacrifice ratios as defined 
above.   The following table summarises the results obtained for both ratios 
and using a 1-period, 5-period and 10-period horizon in the variance 
decompositions
28: 
Table 4: Sacrifice and Benefit Ratios 
Sacrifice Ratio Benefit Ratio Sacrifice Ratio Benefit Ratio Sacrifice Ratio Benefit Ratio
Chile 3.05 43.56 3.98 41.32 3.99 41.32
Mexico -18.63 9.32 -16.39 4.47 -17.45 5.19
Brazil 9.62 32.74 13.00 32.40 13.01 32.36
New Zealand* -51.28 59.40 -46.10 55.85 -33.75 48.32
Australia* 0.29 23.26 -5.69 25.09 -5.65 23.33
Canada  -8.94 2.96 -13.48 4.38 -13.48 4.39
Sweden -9.14 14.21 -10.09 16.49 -11.51 18.38
United Kingdom -10.38 17.47 -14.02 21.15 -14.67 21.49
Israel -22.26 -25.54 -25.33 -24.34 -25.32 -24.33
Lag 1 Lag 5 Lag 10
 
 
The results regarding the sacrifice and benefit ratios are surprising.  In 
particular it is notable that in 6 of the 9 countries there appears to be negative 
sacrifice ratios at the first lag and in 7 of the 9 countries at the tenth lag.  This 
implies that with the adoption of inflation targeting, the real exchange rate is 
driven more by real shocks and less by nominal shocks.  The two remaining 
countries where sacrifices are positive at a lag length of ten are Chile, where 
the sacrifice is relatively small (an additional 3% of real exchange rate 
movements are explained by nominal shocks post IT) and Brazil where the 
sacrifice is higher (some 13% at the tenth lag). 
 
                                                           
28 For all countries a period refers to one month except Australia and New Zealand where 
we work with quarterly information. For these countries the lags are 1-period, 2-period and 
4-periods. Moreover, the benefit ratios appear to be in general large and positive 
implying that the nominal rate reflects much more the real shocks post 
inflation targeting.  This is especially the case for New Zealand, Chile, Brazil, 
Australia and the UK.  The benefit ratios for Mexico and Canada are small - 
although the sacrifice ratios are negative – and Israel is clearly a special case 
where the benefit ratio and the sacrifice ratio are both negative.  This implies 
that in Israel after IT, the nominal exchange rate reflects more the nominal 
shocks (negative benefit) and the real exchange rate reflects more the real 
shocks (negative sacrifice).  It is as if the nominal and the real economies have 
become more independent from each other. 
 
For two countries – namely the Chile and the UK – where the data allows, we 
consider whether there has been any ‘learning’ or gain in credibility over the 
period of post IT.  In both cases we split the sample in 1996.  For the case of 
the UK this corresponds to when the Bank of England was granted greater 
independence and specifically “instrument independence” and in the case of 
Chile when, arguably, the Central Bank was applying a more pure inflation-
targeting regime. The results are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: 
Sacrifice Ratio Benefit Ratio Sacrifice Ratio Benefit Ratio Sacrifice Ratio Benefit Ratio
Chile
1991-2001 3.05 43.56 3.98 41.32 3.99 41.32
1991-1996 1.39 32.51 1.34 30.00 1.32 29.99
1997-2001 6.40 47.55 12.91 39.74 13.67 40.46
United Kingdom
1993-2001 -10.38 17.47 -14.02 21.15 -14.67 21.49
1993-1996 -7.46 8.90 -11.55 15.85 -12.35 16.37
1997-2001 -8.43 21.98 -13.70 25.37 -14.58 26.01
Lag 1 Lag 5 Lag 10
 
 The results indicate that comparing the two post-IT periods with the pre-IT 
period, in the case of Chile the benefit ratio rises but so too does the sacrifice 
ratio.  The nominal exchange rate was then allowed greater flexibility to 
reflect more the real shocks but at the cost that the real exchange rate reflected 
more the nominal shocks.  In the case of the UK the benefit ratio in the second 
period is greater and the sacrifice ratio is more negative.  Hence, the real 
exchange rate reflected more the real shocks and the nominal exchange rate 
also reflected more the nominal shocks. In the case of the UK, a case can be 
made then that over time there was an overall improvement in the functioning 
of the IT regime whereas in the case of Chile there was a tradeoff – more 
benefit but also a slightly higher sacrifice.  
 
Table 4 gives quite strong support for inflation targeting, as in general there 
appears to be a significant benefit but with little or negative sacrifice.  
However, there may be quite different reasons why we are obtaining these 
results in different countries related to how IT is working across different 
countries.  To investigate this further, in Table 6 we present a matrix of the 
decomposition of real and nominal exchange rate movements into the real and 
nominal shocks in the post IT periods for all the 9 countries.  
Table 6: 
Nominal Real Nominal Real
Nominal  81.1 18.9 39.7 60.3
Real 9.4 90.6 13.3 86.7
Nominal 70.4 29.6 65.2 34.8
Real 50.7 49.3 33.2 66.8
Nominal 93.4 6.6 61.1 38.9
Real 27.9 72.1 40.9 59.1
Nominal 66.1 33.9 17.8 82.2
Real 52.5 47.5 18.7 81.3
Nominal 25.7 74.3 2.4 97.6
Real 15.2 84.8 9.5 90.5
Nominal 47.3 52.7 42.9 57.1
Real 20.8 79.2 7.3 92.7
Nominal 35.0 65.0 16.6 83.4
Real 16.1 83.9 4.6 95.4
Nominal 29.5 70.5 8.0 92.0
Real 19.6 80.4 4.9 95.1
Nominal 72.6 27.4 97.0 3.0














* For New Zealand and Australia we show lag 4, because they have quarterly data. 
This Table is revealing in a number of ways.  First it is extraordinary to note 
that in the case of the UK, 95% of real exchange rate movements reflect real 
shocks and some 92% of nominal exchange rate movements also reflect real 
shocks!  A similar but not quite so extreme pattern is also found in the cases of 
Sweden (95% and 83% respectively) and Australia (90% and 97% 
respectively). 
 Canada, New Zealand and Chile represent more mixed cases where in the case 
of Canada the real exchange rate is driven 93% by real shocks but the nominal 
exchange rate only reflects the real shocks to the tune of 57% and for New 
Zealand the real exchange rate reflects 74% real shocks and the nominal 
exchange rate 79% real shocks.  In the case of Chile the real exchange rate 
reflects the real shocks as much as 87% and the nominal exchange rate reflects 
the real shocks some 60%. 
 
In the cases of Mexico and Brazil, the real and the nominal exchange rates are 
driven more by the nominal shocks.  We might conclude that these are cases 
where the full potential benefits of a successful IT regime have yet to be 
reaped.  Israel, as before, is a special case where 97% of the real exchange rate 
is driven by the real shocks and 97% of the nominal exchange rate is driven by 
the nominal shocks!  It is as if the nominal and the real economy are virtually 
independent.  
 
The above results can also be summarized in the form of a graph – namely an 
x-y plot, where each point represents a country – in the post IT regime – and 
where the axes represent the percentage of the real exchange rate explained by 




 The graph shows the different country groups as identified above.   In the top 
right corner we have as a first group the UK, Sweden and Australia illustrating 
that both the nominal and real exchange rates are very largely explained by 
real shocks in these countries.   A mixed second group then comprises of 
Canada, New Zealand and Chile where either the nominal shocks explain a 
higher percentage of the real exchange rate (New Zealand) or the nominal 
exchange rate (Canada and Chile).  We then have a third group of Mexico and 
Brazil where both the real and nominal exchange rate are driven much more 
by the nominal shocks and finally the special case of Israel where the real 
exchange rate is driven almost entirely by the real shocks and the nominal 
exchange rate by the nominal shocks. 
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AustraliaBroadly speaking there are two theories that might explain these results across 
countries.  The first is simply that the first group of countries has extremely 
high “credibility” in their monetary regimes and hence the influence of 
nominal shocks is limited, while the third group has yet to gain “full-
credibility”.  The second group of countries is in an intermediary position.  An 
alternative view however is that “credibility” is in fact in itself related to the 
size of the real shocks in that if a country suffers very high real volatility it is 
then extremely difficult to gain “full credibility”.  Rather than credibility being 
an independent asset to do say with institutions, this view suggests that it is 
itself endogenous to the size of the real shocks and countries, where the effect 
of the nominal shocks is large will also be those countries that suffer large real 
shocks. 
 
Graph 2: Size of Real Shock Versus
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AustraliaOur econometric methodology, by disentangling the real from the nominal 
shocks, allows us to investigate precisely this issue.  In Graph 2, we plot the 
size of the real shock (or in other words the standard error of the equation for 
the real exchange rate) against the percentage of the movement of the real 
exchange rate explained by the real shocks (from the variance decomposition 
of the structural VAR).  The Graph is not conclusive of any particular 
relationship.  However, for those that claim a negative relationship, it is clear 
that controlling for the size of the negative shocks, Australia and New Zealand 
perform well relative to Brazil and Mexico.  Australia in particular has 
suffered from very large real shocks during its IT regime and yet the real 
exchange rate has been affected very little by other factors apart from those 
real shocks.  
 
A second way to consider the importance of the nominal shocks on the real 
exchange rate is not through the second moment (the variation of the real 
exchange rate is explained), but rather by the first moment or in the language 
of the structural VAR by the impulse response.  In this case we want to know 
how important is the absolute response and hence we consider the 
standardized impulse response multiplied by the standard error of the nominal 
shock.. This then gives us a comparative measure of the importance of the 
immediate effect of the nominal shock on the real exchange rate.
29  In Graph 3 
we then plot the size of the standard deviation of the real shock (standard error 
of the equation for the real exchange rate) against the first period absolute 
impulse response of the nominal shock on the real exchange rate. 
                                                           
29 We find that the effect of the nominal shock as would be expected given the constraints on the structural 
Var die out reasonably quickly. There is some evidence here of a positive relationship although, consistent 
with Graph 2, it is clear that controlling for the size of the real shock Australia 
does well compared to Brazil (i.e.: there is a lower effect of nominal shocks on 
the real exchange rate) and the effects of the nominal shock on the real 
exchange rate is about the same for New Zealand as Mexico even though New 
Zealand suffered much larger real shocks.  Consistent with our previous 
results, the UK has surprisingly high real shocks but a lower effect of the 
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IsraelThere is then mixed evidence with respect to the argument that the size of the 
real shocks matters in terms of how important nominal shocks are in 
explaining real exchange ate movements but that even taking into account a 
potential relation there remain differences across countries.  In other words, to 
explain our results, admittedly based on the handful of country observations 
that are available to date, there also appears to be something else present.  We 
posit that this something might well be related to institutional factors, 




In this paper we have proposed a new test for the success of inflation targeting 
based on a set of variance decompositions stemming from a structural VAR 
estimation in countries that have adopted inflation targeting.  We have 
presented results on a sample of 9 countries - 5 industrialised and 4 emerging. 
 
Inflation targeting (IT) has frequently been adopted to replace some other kind 
of nominal anchor, typically an implicit or explicit exchange rate target or 
band and to allow for greater nominal exchange rate flexibility such that the 
nominal exchange rate can act as a type of shock absorber for the real 
economy.  This suggests that it might be expected that under IT, nominal 
exchange rates might reflect more the real shocks but that the real exchange 
rate might reflect more nominal shocks that drive the nominal exchange rate 
away from some fundamental equilibrium value.  The former we use as the basis of our proposed benefit ratio and the second the basis of our proposed 
sacrifice ratio. 
 
Our results give quite strong support for inflation targeting.  Indeed 
considering the 10 period horizon, 7 of the 9 countries display negative 
sacrifice ratios.  And of the two that have a positive sacrifice it is relatively 
small in the case of Chile (4%) but a little higher for Brazil (13%).  On the 
other hand, 6 of the 9 countries have a benefit ratio higher than 10%. 
 
However, we also find strong differences across counties in terms of how IT is 
working.  In the case of the UK, Sweden and Australia we find that real 
exchange rate and nominal exchange rate changes are almost exclusively 
explained by real shocks.  More mixed cases are New Zealand, Canada and 
Chile.  Brazil and Mexico have yet to fully reap the potential benefits of IT 
according to these measures and Israel appears as a special case where the 
nominal exchange rate is almost entirely driven the nominal shocks and the 
real exchange rate by real shocks. 
 
Investigating these results more closely, we find that there is mixed evidence 
of a relationship between the size of the real shocks and the importance of the 
nominal shocks in explaining real exchange rate movements.  However, even 
taking such a relationship into account there remains cross-country differences 
indicating for example, that given the size of the real shocks Australia and 
New Zealand have performed extremely well and Brazil and Mexico not so well.  We conclude then that apart from this relationship there appears to be 
something else at work that may be related more to institutional factors, 
reputation and credibility.  While IT is still young in these countries it is 
notable that the most important institutional difference of the IT regimes of 
these two countries and the more successful inflation targeters appears to be 
the degree of autonomy of the respective Central Banks. 
 
 
As more data becomes available for more countries, it will be interesting to 
compare the results of this type of analysis against the characteristics of the IT 
regimes as discussed in the first section of this paper.  New Zealand is 
recognised as having the most ‘rule based’ IT system and this has clearly led 
to significant benefits (and negative sacrifices) comparing the pre and post IT 
regimes and comparing performance across countries given the size of the real 
shocks suffered.  However, at the same time the most successful IT regimes 
according to our measures have greater in-built flexibility (namely the UK, 
Sweden) and there is also evidence that the UK has improved performance 
over time perhaps as a result of learning, greater Bank of England autonomy 
or greater pure credibility
30.  Over time with more data to work with it might 
be possible to investigate whether certain IT regime characteristics are secrets 
for success or whether there really is no one size fits all and IT regime 
characteristics should be modelled to particular country situations. 
 
                                                           
30 Chile has also been relatively successful according to our measures and increased the 
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